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Abstract 
Purpose – We assess growth determinants in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) fast-developing nations for 
the period 2001-2011. Particular emphasis is laid on the bundling and unbundling of ten 
governance dynamics.  
 
Design/methodology/approach- Contemporary and non-contemporary Fixed- and Random-
Effects regressions are employed as empirical strategies.  GDP growth and real GDP output 
are used as dependent variables. The governance variables are bundled by means of principal 
component analysis.  
 
Findings- The following are some findings. First, governance is more positively significant in 
non-contemporary specifications as opposed to contemporary regressions. Second, there is 
some interesting evidence on the heterogeneity of political governance as a driver. Political 
governance and its constituents (political stability and voice & accountability) are 
significantly positive in GDP growth but insignificant in real GDP output regressions. Third, 
the other governance dynamics are more significant determinants of real GDP output, as 
opposed to GDP growth. Accordingly, they are insignificant in contemporary regressions and 
negatively significant in non-contemporary regressions for GDP growth. Fourth, the 
constituents of economic governance have the highest magnitude in the positive effects of 
governance dynamics on real GDP output. 
 
Practical implications- The following are some practical implications. First, lag determinants 
are necessary for growth targeting or timing of growth dynamics. Growth drivers for the most 
part are more significantly determined by past information.  Second, political governance is 
the most important driver of economic growth, with the significance of effects more apparent 
in non-contemporary regressions.  Third, economic governance and institutional governance 
are more positively predisposed to driving real GDP output than GDP growth.  
 
Originality/value- As far as we have reviewed, it is the first study to investigate growth 
determinants in the BRICS and MINT nations.  It has strong implications for other developing 
countries on the contemporary and non-contemporary dynamics of governance in driving 
economic prosperity.   
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1. Introduction 
State and market failures have led to an evolving paradigm of post Washington 
Consensus (WC) development models (Fofack, 2014, p. 9). They include inter alia:  the 
Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and the New Structural Economics (NSE). The latter has 
been advanced by Lin and Monga (2011), Norman and Stiglitz (2012), Stiglitz et al. (2013ab), 
Stiglitz and Lin (2013) and Monga (2014). The NSE advocates for the reconciliation between 
structuralism and liberalism ideologies. The former school or the LIP put forward by 
Acemoglu et al. (2005), Rodrik (2008) and Brett (2009), among others, is concerned with: the 
quality of institutions for the delivery of public goods, institutional diversity and institutional 
conditions for economic growth.  
In light of the above, a recent drift from the WC is a decision by the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations on the 15
th
 of July 2014 to create a New 
Development Bank (NDB). The establishment of the new bank has prompted much debate 
and reactions in policy circles (Griffith-Jones, 2014; Khanna, 2014). Most of the questions 
arising have been substantially documented, among others: ‘What is the purpose of this 
BRICS bank? Why have these countries created it now? And, what implications does it have 
for the global development-finance landscape?’ (Desai & Vreeland, 2014).  A resulting 
certainty however is that an important rate of economic growth would have to be sustained for 
the BRICS to foster the ambitions of her NDB and Contingency Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA). This motivates an important policy concern of what drives economic growth in fast- 
developing nations. In essence, understanding determinants of economic growth in fast- 
growing emerging economies holds important lessons for less developed countries.  
It is important to briefly engage the CRA and NDB before focusing on our principal 
line of inquiry. With respect to the introductory narrative, the CRA is a $ 100 billion 
contingency fund intended for liquidity to member states in event of balance sheet crises. 
Contributions to the fund are to the tune of 5%, 18%, 18%, 18% and 41% for South Africa, 
Russia, Brazil, India and China respectively.  On the other hand, the NDB is a bank with an 
initial $50 billion capital. Unlike contributions to the CRA which are based on economic 
4 
 
fundamentals, those to the bank among BRICS members are on equal-share basis. Hence, 
equal voting rights are conferred to all member states.  
In accordance with the literature on fast-growing emerging economies, there are a 
plethora of benefits from high economic prosperity. These include, inter alia: employment, 
finance and positive rewards for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) like corporate 
governance, know-how transfer and managerial expertise (Akpan et al., 2014; Asongu & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015). In line with the United Nations 
Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD, 2013), the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria & Turkey) and BRICS countries have constituted around  a fifth of world GDP and 
about 50% of world FDI in recent years. In essence, as shown in Table 1, the growth 
experienced by these nine countries was about 19% of the global GDP during the 2001-2012 
period. During the same period, these nations have represented around 30% of the world FDI 
and about 51% of the global population (World Bank, 2013).  
 
Table 1: Stylized facts on BRICS and MINT 
  
GDP 
(constant 
2005 
US$, 
billions) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2005 
US$) 
GDP 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
FDI net 
inflows 
(BoP, 
current 
US$, 
billions)* 
Population 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
Population, 
total, 
millions 
Natural 
resources, 
Share of 
GDP* 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Brazil 1136.56 5721.23 0.87 0.00 71.54 0.87 198.66 5.72 0.73 
China 4522.14 3348.01 7.80 7.28 280.07 0.49 1350.70 9.09 0.70 
India 1368.76 1106.80 3.24 1.94 32.19 1.26 1236.69 7.36 0.55 
Indonesia 427.47 1731.59 6.23 4.91 19.24 1.25 246.86 10.00 0.63 
Mexico 997.10 8250.87 3.92 2.65 21.50 1.24 120.85 9.02 0.78 
Nigeria 177.67 1052.34 6.55 3.62 8.84 2.79 168.83 35.77 0.47 
Russia 980.91 6834.01 3.44 3.03 55.08 0.40 143.53 22.03 0.79 
South Africa 307.31 6003.46 2.55 1.34 5.89 1.18 51.19 10.64 0.63 
Turkey 628.43 8492.61 2.24 0.94 16.05 1.28 74.00 0.84 0.72 
*2011 data                   
 Source of data: UNDP (2013), World Bank (2013) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
 Despite the growing importance of the BRICS and MINT countries, as far as we have 
reviewed, literature on them is scarce. Accordingly, most lines of inquiry on the exposition 
have been oriented towards FDI determinants. The few studies that fall within this stream of 
the literature are: works that exclusively target the BRICS (Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Jadhav, 
2012; Jadhav & Katti, 2012) and more extensive expositions that have added  MINT nations 
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to the BRICS (Akpan et al., 2014; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015;  Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2015).    
The stream of literature that has motivated queries on determinants of growth is also 
not abundant. First, education as a determinant of growth in the BRIC countries has been 
assessed by Sheng-jun (2011) to establish that while Brazil and Russia have invested 
comparatively more in education, as opposed to India and China, growth is more apparent in 
the latter nations. Second, Basu et al. (2013) have followed a similar line of inquiry to 
conclude that the growth potential of BRICS countries is substantially contingent on the 
ability of its citizens to develop working-age skills. Third, the nexus between FDI and growth 
has been investigated by Agrawal (2013) in the BRICS to establish that there is a long-run 
nexus flowing from FDI to growth. Fourth, Goel and Korhonen (2011) have also contributed 
to the literature by investigating three main concerns in the BRIC nations, namely: “(a) How 
do medium term growth determinants differ from short term determinants? (b) What are 
differences between growth effects of aggregate versus disaggregated exports? And (c) Does 
lower institutional quality hinder growth?” The results show that, while BRIC countries are 
predisposed to higher growth, some significant within-group differences are apparent. India 
shows some positive growth, Russia and China reflect higher levels, whereas Brazil fails to 
outperform the corresponding three nations.  
 The present study extends the above literature by investigating the determinants of 
growth in the BRICS and MINT nations with particular emphasis on bundling and unbundling 
governance dyanmics. In summary, it has at least four contributions to existing literature. 
First, depending on the outcome of the Hausman test for endogeneity, we employ Fixed-
effects (FE) or Random-effects (RE) estimations. The FE regressions have the additional 
interest of accounting for some unobserved heterogeneity like time- and country-effects. 
Second, non-contemporary and contemporary specifications are used to examine whether 
growth drivers depend on some underlying contemporary characteristics. Hence, contrary to 
some previous studies, our estimation techniques have some bite on endogeneity. E.g Sheng-
jun  (2011) is based on averages of data (p. 190-193). Third, the underlying literature on 
growth determinants have been limited to BRIC (Sheng-jun, 2011; Goel & Korhonen, 2011) 
or BRICS (Agrawal, 2013; Basu et al., 2013) countries. Hence, we complement the 
underlying stream by investigating both MINT and BRICS nations. Fourth, following Asongu  
and Nwachukwu (2015) in the FDI current, we bundle and unbundle governance determinants 
in order to provide more room for policy implications. The adopted governance dynamics 
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include: political govenance, institutional governance, economic govenance, general 
govenance, voice and accountability, political stability/no voilence, government effectiveness, 
regulation quality, rule of law and corruption-control
2
.  
 We devote some space to briefly discussing the motivation for articulating 
goverannce. In essence, the intuition draws from a recent current of the  literaure broadly 
based on bundling and unbundling governance for more subtlety in development implications. 
First, the impact of a plethora of governance indicators on innovation has been examined by 
Oluwatobi et al. (2014) to establish that government effectiveness and regulation quality 
(constituting economic govenance) are most instrumental in Africa. Second, the impact of 
formal institutions on software piracy has been investigated by Andrés and Asongu (2013) 
who have concluded that corruption-control is the most effective tool for mitigating software 
piracy. Andrés et al. (2014) extend the study by assessing if the implementation of treaties on 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) contribute to knowledge economy(KE). They conclude that, 
governance dynamics are necessary but not a sufficient condition for KE, contingent on the 
intrumentality of IPRs treaties. The same empirical strategy has been employed in some 
empirics to predict the Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2014a) and assess the effect of 
lifelong learning on non-voilence/political stability (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2014b). Drawing 
from the above; Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) have investigated the most effective 
government tools in the fight against African conflicts and crimes to conclude that corruption-
control is the most effective tool.  
 The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. The data and methodology are 
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes with 
implications.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2. 1 Data  
 The study examines a panel of nine MINT and BRICS nations with data for the period 
2001-2011 from Apkan et al. (2014). The principal data sources are World Governance 
Indicators and World Development Indicators from the World Bank. The data has also been 
used by Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) in the FDI-
                                                          
2
 Institutions and governance are interchangeably used throughout the study.  The former concept is quite distinct 
from ‘institutional governance’ which is represented by the rule of law and corruption-control.  
.  
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determinant literature. We use two dependent variables for the purpose of robustness, namely: 
real GDP output and GDP growth.  
 The governance dynamics which are our main independent variables include: (i) 
corruption-control, (ii) the rule of law, (iii) government effectiveness, (iv) regulation quality, 
(v) political stability, (vi) voice and accountability, (vii) general governance, (viii) 
institutional governance, (ix) economic govenance and (x) political governance. The last-four 
are bundled indicators that are common factors derived from the first-six, by means of the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique which we discuss in Section 3.2.1.  
 Adopted control variables are in line with the UNCTAD (2002) presented in Table 2. 
These have also been adopted by Akpan et al. (2014) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015). 
They include: natural resources, private credit, infrastructure and inflation. But for high 
inflation which decreases economic growth, expected signs from the remaining three 
variables are positive. It is important to note that the expected inflation sign could also be 
positive because, stable and low inflation are needed for a promising economic outlook 
(Asongu, 2013). Inflation which is measured by the Consumer Price Index is in line with 
Barro (2003), bank credit is justified by Asongu (2015), and natural resources (% of GDP) are 
consistent with Fosu (2013). ‘Mobile phones’ (per 100 people) which is used as a proxy for 
infrastructure, is in accordance with Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis  (2007) and Asiedu 
(2002). The relevance of infrastructure as an important growth determinant has been recently 
documented by Sahoo et al. (2010) on a unidirectional flow of causality from infrastructure to 
output in China.  
 
Table 2: Classification of Growth determinants 
  
Determining Variables  Examples 
  
Policy variables Tax policy, trade policy, privatization policy, 
macroeconomic policy  
  
Business variables Investment incentives 
  
Market-related economic determinants Market size, market growth, market structure 
  
Resource-related economic determinants Raw materials, labor cost, technology 
  
Efficiency-related economic determinants Transport and communication costs, labor 
productivity  
  
Source: UNCTAD (2002) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
 The descriptive statistics of the indicators are shown in Table 3. Two points are 
noteworthy. On the one hand, the indicators are relatively comparable. On the other hand, the 
rate of variation is quite substantial for us to expect plausible nexuses from the estimations.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics  
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs 
      
GDP Growth (GDPg) 5.351 3.789 -7.820 14.200 90 
Real GDP (constant of 2005 US billions) (log) 6.346 0.886 4.260 8.341 90 
Infrastructure (Number of mobile phones per 100 people) 52.433 39.220 0.210 179.31 90 
Bank Credit (on GDP) 85.019 63.492 4.909 201.58 90 
Natural resources (on GDP) 9.003 8.110 0.294 38.410 90 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 8.580 7.519 -0.765 54.400 90 
Voice & Accountability  -0.192 0.680 -1.681 0.727 90 
Political Stability -0.826 0.613 -2.193 0.286 90 
Regulation Quality -0.104 0.437 -1.322 0.778 90 
Government Effectiveness -0.100 0.454 -1.200 0.691 90 
Rule of Law -0.428 0.458 -1.522 0.279 90 
Corruption Control -0.431 0.462 -1.333 0.612 90 
Political Governance 0.000 1.153 -2.210 1.976 90 
Economic Governance -0.000 1.372 -3.291 2.639 90 
Institutional Governance 0.000 1.348 -3.048 2.412 90 
General Governance  0.000 2.124 -4.650 3.765 90 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
In accordance with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2014a, 2015), we employ the PCA 
technique in bundling and unbundling the governance dynamics. The PCA is usually used to 
reduce highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated principal components 
(PCs). The corresponding correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.  The criterion used to 
retain the PCs is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) who have recommended the retention 
of those with an eigenvalue greater than the mean or more than one. Hence, as presented in 
Table 5 below, the retained common factors all have eigenvalues greater than one. For 
example, the general governance indicator has an eigenvalue of about 4.51 with a 
corresponding total variation of more than 75%. In other words, when the six governance 
indicators are bundled, the resulting general governance index represents about 75% of total 
variability in the six constituent indicators. This logic is consistent with the reported values 
for political, economic and institutional governance dynamics.   
 “Political governance, which measures the election and replacement of political 
leaders is approximated by: voice & accountability and political stability/non-violence; 
Economic governance, which is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public commodities, is denoted by regulation quality and government effectiveness ; 
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Institutional governance, which is defined as the respect of the State and citizens of 
institutions that govern interactions between them is measured by the rule of law and 
corruption-control” (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015a, p. 11; Andrés et al., 2014).   
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
           
VA PS RQ GE RL CC Polgov Ecogov Instgov G.Gov  
1.000 0.329 0.542 0.457 0.538 0.623 0.815 0.515 0.614 0.648 VA 
 1.000 0.774 0.759 0.579 0.752 0.815 0.790 0.698 0.817 PS 
  1.000 0.883 0.716 0.886 0.807 0.970 0.840 0.934 RQ 
   1.000 0.827 0.861 0.746 0.970 0.885 0.936 GE 
    1.000 0.818 0.685 0.795 0.953 0.868 RL 
     1.000 0.849 0.900 0.953 0.959 CC 
      1.000 0.800 0.804 0.899 Polgov 
       1.000 0.889 0.963 Ecogov 
        1.000 0.958 Instgov 
         1.000 G.Gov 
           
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
  
Table 5: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Bundling Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.305 0.385 0.440 0.441 0.409 0.452 0.752 0.752 4.514 
Second  PC 0.848 -0.461 -0.207 -0.115 0.096 0.048 0.121 0.874 0.731 
Third PC 0.337 0.532 -0.240 0.192 -0.714 0.012 0.064 0.938 0.385 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.664 0.664 1.329 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.335 1.000 0.670 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.941 0.941 1.883 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.058 1.000 0.116 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.909 0.909 1.818 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.090 1.000 0.181 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
  
 It is important to discuss issues that could result from estimates originating from 
underlying regressions. According to Asongu and Nwachukwu (2014b), these concerns have 
been raised by Pagan (1984, p. 242) who has established that there are three main issues with 
augmented regressors, notably: (i) efficiency, (ii) consistency and, (iii) inferential validity of 
estimations from second stage regressions. According of the narrative, while the two-step 
process produces efficient and consistent estimates, not all resulting inferences are valid. 
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There is also an abundant supply of recent literature on inferential issues from two-stage 
modelling, notably: Oxley and McAleer (1993), McKenzie and McAleer (1997), Ba and Ng 
(2006) and Westerlund and Urbain (2013a).  
 The use of PC-augmented estimators is also consistent with the above narrative. As far 
as we know, Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have drawn from existing studies to 
elucidate factors derived from PCA, notably: Stock and Watson (2002), Bai (2003), Pesaran 
(2006), Bai (2009) and Greenaway-McGrevy et al. (2012). They have established that normal 
inferences are possible with PC regressors provided the estimated coefficients converge at a 
rate  NT  towards their real values. Since, N (T) is the number of cross-sections (time 
series), we argue in the present exposition that our sample cannot be extended beyond nine 
countries because the line of inquiry is positioned on the BRICS and MINT nations. 
   
3. 2 Estimation Technique  
 Consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015a), we examine contemporary and 
non-contemporary drivers of growth using panel regressions. Results of the Hausman test for 
endogeneity determine the choice of either a Fixed Effects (FE) or a Random Effects (RE) 
model. The specifications are also modelled to control for time-effects.  
 For the purpose of simplicity, we assume the presence of endogeneity, so that Eq. (1) 
and Eq. (2) below represent respectively the corresponding FE contemporary and non-
contemporary specifications. 
     
  
tititih
n
h
j
m
j
ti WGrowth ,,,
11
,   
             
(1) 
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m
j
ti WGrowth ,1,,
11
,   


           
(2) 
 
Where: tiGrowth ,
 
 is economic prosperity (represented by GDP growth or real GDP output) 
for country i
 
at period t ; 
 
is a constant;
 
W  is the vector of determinants (governance 
dynamics and control variables); i is the country-specific effect; t is the time-specific effect 
and ti ,  the error term. The specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent (HAC) consistent in standard errors. We also control for serious issues of 
multicollinearity and overparameterization using the correlation matrix presented in Table 6. 
From a preliminary assessment of associations between governance dynamics and growth 
variables, nexuses with GDP growth (real GDP output) are negative (positive).  
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Table 6: Correlation matrix  
                 
Control Variables Governance Variables Dependent Variables  
                 
Infra Infla Credit Nres VA PS Pgov RQ GE Egov RL CC Ingov Ggov GDP RGDP  
1.000 -0 .102 0.210 0.277 0.032 0.291 0.198 0.291 0.190 0.248 0.132 0.141 0.143 0.212 -0.200 0.198 Infra 
 1.000 -0.0004 0.077 -0.061 -0.274 -0.205 -0.124 -0.254 -0.193 -0.150 -0.253 -0.211 -0.219 -0.225 -0.339 Infla 
  1.000 -0.488 0.114 0.548 0.406 0.585 0.682 0.658 0.716 0.703 0.744 0.668 0.031 0.144 Credit 
   1.000 -0.269 -0.228 -0.305 -0.261 -0.345 -0.312 -0.490 -0.455 -0.495 -0.397 0.051 0.066 Nres 
    1 .000 0.329 0.815 0.542 0.457 0.515 0.538 0.632 0.614 0.648 -0.409 -0.241 VA 
     1.000 0.815 0.774 0.759 0.790 0.579 0.752 0.698 0.817 -0.194 0.450 PS 
      1.000 0.807 0.746 0.800 0.685 0.849 0.804 0.899 -0.370 0.128 Pgov 
       1.000 0.883 0.970 0.716 0.886 0.840 0.934 -0.354 0.255 RQ 
        1.000 0.970 0.827 0.861 0.885 0.936 -0.163 0.393 GE 
         1.000 0.795 0.900 0.889 0.963 -0.266 0.334 Egov 
          1.000 0.818 0.953 0.868 -0.069 0.326 RL 
           1.000 0.953 0.959 -0.229 0.181 CC 
            1.000 0.958 -0.156 0.266 Ingov 
             1.000 -0.263 0.282 Ggov 
              1.000 0.222 GDP 
               1.000 RGDP 
                 
Infra: Infrastructure. Infla: Inflation. Credit : Domestic Credit. Nres: Natural resources. VA: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability. Polgov: Political governance.  RQ: Regulation Quality. GE: Government 
Effectiveness. Egov: Economic governance. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Corruption-Control. Ingov: Institutional governance. Ggov: General governance. GDPg: GDP growth rate. RGDP: Real GDP. 
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4. Empirical results  
 The results presented in Table 7(8) are contemporary (non-contemporary) drivers of 
growth.  In Panel A of both tables, the dependent variable is the GDP growth rate while in the 
corresponding Panel B of the two tables; Real GDP output is the dependent variable.  As 
discussed in the methodology section, a decision of if the RE or FE model is appropriate, is 
contingent on the Hausman test. Accordingly, a FE model is adopted when the null hypothesis 
of the underlying test is rejected. This implies that the country-specific factors are relevant in 
explaining economic growth. The following general results can be observed: contemporary 
drivers are more significant compared to non-contemporary determinants.   
  The following could be established from Table 7 revealing contemporary results. 
First, only political stability is significant in stimulation GDP growth. Second, governance 
dynamics have a positive effect on real GDP growth with the following increasing order of 
magnitude: institutional governance, economic governance, general governance, rule of law, 
corruption-control, regulation quality and government effectiveness. It is important to note 
that these estimated variables are comparable for at least three reasons: (a) the same variables 
are employed in the specifications; (b) the number of observations in specifications is equal 
and (c) the line of interpretation is consistent with the underlying literature on bundling and 
unbundling governance (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016).  Third, 
the significant control variables have signs that are consistent with expectations. Accordingly, 
on the one hand, the positive effects of natural resources and infrastructure on real GDP 
output are expected (Panel B). On the other hand, the negative effect of infrastructure on 
GDP growth may be traceable to the low usage of mobile phones for mobile banking 
purposes in the sampled countries.  
 It is relevant to devote some space in clarifying the negative effect of infrastructure 
which has been proxied by mobile phone penetration. While mobile telephony has been 
established to positively affect economic growth (Sridhar & Sridhar, 2007), it is 
comparatively less used in BRICS and MINT countries for banking-related activities. 
Consistent with Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2013), global averages for ‘mobile phone penetration’ 
(per 100 people), ‘mobile phone used to send/receive money’ (% of adults) and ‘mobile phone 
used to pay bills’ (% of adults) are respectively: 90.90, 4.71 and 3. 51. Corresponding rates in 
the MINT and BRICS countries are: Mexico (82.4; 1.5; 3.9); Indonesia (97.7; 0.6; 0.2); 
Nigeria (58.6; 9.9; 1.4); Turkey (88.7; 2.2; 4.3); Brazil (123.2; 0; 1.3), Russia (179.3; 1.5; 
1.7); India (72; 0.6; 2.2); China (73.2; 0.6; 1.3) and South Africa (126.8; 5.4; 4.4). Therefore 
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the relative low usage of mobile phones for other services could elucidate the unexpected 
negative nexus of infrastructure with GDP growth
3
. 
 
Table 7: Contemporary determinants (Panel Fixed- and Random-Effects) 
           
 Panel A : GDPg  
           
Constant  0.790 3.023 1.508 0.613 0.610 0.463 1.017 0.578 0.648 0.593 
 (0.74) (0.259) (0.658) (0.813) (0.818) (0.862) (0.717) (0.832) (0.805) (0.817) 
Voice & Accountability  0.292 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.900)          
Political Stability --- 1.897** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.027)         
Political  Governance  --- --- 1.146 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.176)        
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- 0.701 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.631)       
Government Effectiveness --- --- --- --- 0.247 --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.929)      
Economic Governance  --- --- --- --- --- 0.258 --- --- --- --- 
      (0.758)     
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.043 --- --- --- 
       (0.520)    
Corruption-Control  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.180 --- --- 
        (0.921)   
Institutional Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.164 --- 
         (0.736)  
General Govevernance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.455 
          (0.211) 
Nresources 0.075 0.095 0.091 0.083 0.078 0.085 0.079 0.074 0.076 0.092 
 (0.612) (0.550) (0.516) (0.550) (0.616) (0.552) (0.590) (0.621) (0.600) (0.505) 
Infrastructure -0.036** -0.044*** -0.038 -0.034** -0.036** -0.034** -0.037*** -0.037** -0.03*** -0.033** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.101) (0.018) (0.033) (0.046) (0.008) (0.014) (0.004) (0.019) 
Inflation 0.063 0.052 0.059 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.068 0.060 0.0680 0.072 
 (0.226) (0.316) (0.356) (0.213) (0.204) (0.208) (0.206) (0.302) (0.229) (0.170) 
Domestic Credit 0.034 0.024 0.023 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.034 
 (0.149) (0.377) (0.533) (0.203) (0.213) (0.204) (0.203) (0.198) (0.210) (0.226) 
Hauman test  13.088** 12.171** 12.054** 11.766** 10.387* 10.083* 12.166** 11.605** 11.255** 10.579* 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Within variance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Between variance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Within  R² 0.498 0.517 0.511 0.499 0.498 0.498 0.499 0.498 0.498 0.502 
Fisher  7.347*** 7.758*** 7.635*** 7.364*** 7.346*** 7.358*** 7.374*** 7.346*** 7.351*** 7.429*** 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
           
 Panel B : Real GDP(log)  
           
Constant  5.890*** 5.829*** 5.856*** 5.927*** 5.839*** 5.827*** 5.980*** 6.015*** 5.879*** 5.889*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Voice & Accountability  0.060 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.669)          
Political Stability --- -0.032 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.539)         
Political  Governance  --- --- -0.014 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.705)        
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- 0.413*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.000)       
Government Effectiveness --- --- --- --- 0.453*** --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000)      
Economic Governance  --- --- --- --- --- 0.191*** --- --- --- --- 
      (0.000)     
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.273** --- --- --- 
                                                          
3
 More information on the statistics can be found on the following link : 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/mobile-banking-who-driver-s-seat 
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       (0.014)    
Corruption-Control  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.290*** --- --- 
        (0.000)   
Institutional Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.125*** --- 
         (0.000)  
General Govevernance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.981*** 
          (0.000) 
Nresources 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.0180*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Infrastructure 0.004*** 0.004 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.0001 0.0001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 
 (0.957) (0.961) (0.990) (0.468) (0.647) (0.371) (0.634) (0.114) (0.151) (0.361) 
Domestic Credit 0.0006 0.0009 0.001 0.0008 0.001 0.001 0.0009 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.691) (0.538) (0.536) (0.527) (0.309) (0.325) (0.554) (0.841) (0.725) (0.760) 
Hausman  3.832 2.446 3.223 2.443 1.632 1.828 2.257 2.897 1.969 1.981 
Time effects  No No No No No No No No No No 
Log-likelihood -116.2592 -115.697 -115.048 -113.238 -109.618 -111.297 -111.488 -114.710 -112.619 -112.269 
Within variance  0.012 0.012 0.0124 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 
Between variance  1.093 1.323 1.151 1.255 1.341 1.344 1.243 1.201 1.343 1.330 
Adjusted R² --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
           
*,**,*** : significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively.  
 
 The following findings can be observed from the non-contemporary regressions in 
Table 8. First, for GDP growth (Panel A) only political governance and its components (voice 
& accountability and political stability/non-violence) have a positive effect on GDP growth. 
The order of increasing importance is: political governance (1.161), political stability (1.350) 
and voice and accountability (4.933). The corresponding order of increasing negative 
governance effects is: general governance (-0.96), economic governance (-1.501), regulation 
quality (-3.970), government effectiveness (-4.976) and corruption-control (-5.15).  
 Second, in relation to Panel B, while political governance and its constituents are not 
significant, the other variables are positively significant in the following order of increasing 
magnitude: general governance (0.093), institutional governance (0.141), economic 
governance (0.164), corruption-control (0.279), rule of law (0.357), regulation quality 
(0.364) and government effectiveness (0.377). Third, the control variables have signs that are 
expected for the most part. In addition to those already discussed for Table 7 (natural 
resources and infrastructure), inflation and domestic credit are now significant with the 
expected negative and positive signs respectively.  
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Table 8: Non-Contemporary determinants (Panel Fixed- and Random-Effects) 
           
 Panel A : GDPg  
           
Constant  7.925* 9.209** 6.840*** 5.227*** 5.265*** 5.587*** 7.216* 3.816** 6.019 5.944*** 
 (0.041) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.062) (0.014) (0.143) (0.000) 
Voice & Accountability (-1) 4.933*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.003)          
Political Stability (-1) --- 1.350* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.096)         
Political  Governance (-1) --- --- 1.161** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.010)        
Regulation Quality (-1) --- --- --- -3.970*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.001)       
Government Effectiveness(-1) --- --- --- --- -4.976*** --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000)      
Economic Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- -1.501*** --- --- --- --- 
      (0.000)     
Rule of Law (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.480 --- --- --- 
       (0.244)    
Corruption-Control (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -5.15*** --- --- 
        (0.000)   
Institutional Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.933 --- 
         (0.301)  
General Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.96*** 
          (0.003) 
Natural Resources (-1) 0.141* 0.144 0.148 0.058 0.025 0.043 0.136 0.033 0.131 0.022 
 (0.041) (0.184) (0.157) (0.396) (0.740) (0.553) (0.151) (0.609) (0.123) (0.758) 
Infrastructure (-1) -0.021* -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
 (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) 
Inflation (-1) 0.003 -0.025 -0.020 -0.093 -0.096 -0.097 -0.0009 -0.150** 0.016 -0.106 
 (0.924) (0.512) (0.583) (0.137) (0.137) (0.129) (0.979) (0.022) (0.709) (0.101) 
Domestic Credit (-1) -0.003 0.006 0.001 0.028*** 0.032** 0.031** 0.018 0.035*** 0.016 0.030** 
 (0.925) (0.874) (0.963) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.619) (0.001) (0.685) (0.010) 
Hauman test  11.995** 9.265* 9.044* 8.403 7.159 5.160 13.064** 5.897 9.582* 6.272 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes No 
Log-likelihood --- --- --- -202.225 -205.460 -202.699 --- -200.602 --- -202.816 
Within variance  --- --- --- 8.488 8.123 8.460 --- 8.504 --- 8.502 
Between variance  --- --- --- 1.922 3.003 2.551 --- 1.819 --- 2.390 
Within  R² 0.517 0.509 0.5140 --- --- --- 0.507 --- 0.507 --- 
Fisher  7.372*** 7.212*** 7.297*** --- --- --- 7.158*** --- 7.167*** --- 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
           
 Panel B : Real GDP(log)  
           
Constant  6.012*** 5.957*** 5.969*** 5.999*** 5.937*** 5.913*** 6.107*** 6.095*** 5.964*** 5.976*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Voice & Accountability (-1) 0.116 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.406)          
Political Stability (-1) --- -0.008 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.878)         
Political  Governance (-1) --- --- 0.004 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.902)        
Regulation Quality (-1) --- --- --- 0.364*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.000)       
Government Effectiveness(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.377*** --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.003)      
Economic Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- 0.164*** --- --- --- --- 
      (0.000)     
Rule of Law (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.357*** --- --- --- 
       (0.001)    
Corruption-Control (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.279*** --- --- 
        (0.005)   
Institutional Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.141*** --- 
         (0.000)  
General Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.093*** 
          (0.000) 
Natural Resources (-1) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) 
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Infrastructure (-1) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation (-1) 0.000 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 
 (0.982) (0.885) (0.861) (0.653) (0.868) (0.599) (0.573) (0.157) (0.114) (0.449) 
Domestic Credit (-1) 0.0005 0.0009 0.0008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 
 (0.755) (0.559) (0.589) (0.392) (0.305) (0.256) (0.471) (0.686) (0.589) (0.629) 
Hausman  4.009 2.417 3.053 2.518 1.704 1.918 2.176 3.001 2.009 2.025 
Time effects  No No No No No No No No No No 
Log-likelihood -105.388 -103.105 -102.912 -101.636 -99.003 -100.24 -99.418 -103.007 -101.275 -100.842 
Within variance  0.011 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.0100 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Between variance  1.1015 1.306 1.172 1.240 1.342 1.332 1.242 1.185 1.341 1.323 
Adjusted R² --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
           
*,**,*** : significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively.  
 
 
5. Concluding implications   
  
 We discuss concluding implications in five main strands, notably: differences in 
contemporary and non-contemporary specifications; heterogeneity in political governance; 
differences in the effects of other governance dynamics; interesting magnitude of economic 
governance on real GDP output and negative effects on GDP growth in non-contemporary 
regressions. 
 First, the evidence that governance is more positively significant in non-contemporary 
specifications as opposed to contemporary regressions implies that some lag is necessary for 
growth-targeting or timing of growth dynamics based on anticipated drivers. The interesting 
policy implication is that growth drivers for the most part are more significantly determined 
by past information.  
 Second, there is some interesting evidence on the heterogeneity of the political 
governance driver. We have observed that political governance and its constituents (political 
stability and voice & accountability) are significantly positive in GDP growth but 
insignificant in real GDP output regressions. The inference is consistent for both 
contemporary and non-contemporary specifications. A resulting implication is that the 
election and replacement of political leaders (or political governance) is a more important 
driver of economic growth, with the significance of effects more apparent in non-
contemporary regressions.  
 Third, for the other governance dynamics, we have noticed that they are more 
significant determinants of real GDP output, as opposed to GDP growth. Accordingly, they 
are insignificant in contemporary regressions and negatively significant in non-contemporary 
regressions for GDP growth. As a policy implication, the formulation and implementation of 
policies that deliver public commodities (or economic governance) and the respect of the 
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State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them (or institutional 
governance) are more positively predisposed to driving real GDP output than GDP growth.  
 Fourth, we have also noticed that the constituents of economic governance have the 
highest magnitude in the positive effects of governance dynamics on real GDP output. The 
dominance of economic governance is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) in 
which economic governance, government effectiveness and regulation quality are the most 
significant determinants of FDI in terms of magnitude. This finding is also consistent with the 
underlying institutional literature on innovation. Accordingly, Oluwatobi et al. (2014) have 
recently concluded that the most instrumental driving force in governance  for innovation in 
Africa is economic governance and its consituents. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) and 
Oluwatobi et al. (2014) converge in the perspective that innovation is proxied with FDI in the 
underlying literaure on bundling and unbundling governance (Andrés et al., 2014, p.10).  
 Fifth, the negative effect on GDP growth of economic and institutional governance 
dyanmics in non-contemporary regressions and insignificance in corresponding contemporary 
specifications may imply that these dynamics in governance are less sensitive to ‘business 
cycle’ effects from a contemporary perspective and more negatively senstive from a non-
contemporary view point. This inference is on the assumption that, GDP growth is more 
‘business cycle’ sensitive, compared to real GDP output. Elucicating this concern is an 
interesting future research direction.  
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